Leaked access key
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Customargus-sim-backdoor is a user whose access key sits in SSM, the way a leaked .env file would. The script uses that key from an address on a custom GuardDuty threat list.
iam:UpdateAccessKeyDeactivate every access keyiam:AttachUserPolicyAttach AWSDenyAll. The explicit deny also covers session tokens the user already mintediam:PutRolePolicyFor each role the user assumed, deny sessions issued before now (aws:TokenIssueTime)
iam:DeleteLoginProfileRemove console accessiam:TagUserTag QUARANTINED with the incident key
Keys are deactivated, never deleted. They are evidence.
- Time to contain
- 5 s
- Finding → Argus
- 22.9 s
- Actions recorded
- 9
- Late evidence
- 14 CloudTrail events
Verified liveThe backdoor user had assumed a role. Twelve minutes into that role session, after containment, its next call got an explicit deny.